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Purpose: We investigated the different impacts warranted and 
unwarranted discounts have on IPOs valuation performance and 
underpricing.  
Research methodology: We used multivariate ordinary least 
squares regression analysis to examine discounts’ determinants, and 
their impact on IPOs valuation errors and underpricing. We also 
used bias and accuracy errors to examine valuation performance.  
Results: We find that both final offer price accuracy errors and 
underpricing are negatively related to warranted discounts and 
positively related to unwarranted discounts. Additionally, warranted 
discounts are positively related to fair value estimate bias errors, 
contrarily to unwarranted discounts. 
Limitations: The relatively small sample size represents our study’s 
main limitation. 
Contribution: Unwarranted discounts allow issuers to assess 
underpricing level and underwriters’ sub-optimal efforts and 
investors to assess their positive returns. Whereas warranted 
discounts allow issuers to avoid overpricing IPOs and communicate 
their intrinsic value, investors to assess their negative returns, and 
underwriters to reveal their superior qualitative valuation. 
Regulators can increase after-market efficiency and protect 
investors by implementing unwarranted discounts’ constraints and 
warranted discounts’ thresholds. 
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Discount, Underpricing 
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1. Introduction 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) underpricing is an international phenomenon acknowledged in many 
countries, from developed to emerging ones. Whereby, the first-day market price (MP) is above the 
final offer price (FOP). The literature refers to IPOs underpricing also as IPOs initial returns and IPOs 
discount. However, while underpricing and initial returns are identical because they both refer to the 
difference between MP and FOP, the same cannot be said about the discount. Actually, considering the 
discount the same as underpricing and initial returns can be misleading because it does not represent 
the real discount applied by underwriters when valuing IPOs (Cassia et al., 2004; Deloof et al., 2009; 
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Paleari et al., 2014; Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015). 
This real discount refers rather to the difference between FOP and fair value estimate (FVE) for fixed-
price offerings and preliminary offer price (POP) for book-building offerings (Roosenboom, 2012). 
However, this specific information’s availability depends on each country’s regulations. Hence, most 
studies attempting to investigate IPOs discount consider it rather as the difference between MP and 
FOP, which is exactly the same approach for assessing IPOs underpricing and IPOs initial returns. Such 
approach does not allow examining the relation between discount and underpricing and initial returns 
impartially. Moreover, this discount is post-valuation because it incorporates valuation’s real discount 
applied by underwriters. To avoid any confusion between these concepts, hereafter, underpricing refers 
solely to initial returns while discount refers solely to the real discount. 
IPOs underpricing theories’ main assumption is that IPOs are priced at a discount. Whereby FOP 
already incorporates a finite discount. Yet, studies examining discounts are not that widespread due to 
public unavailability of such information. For instance, discount data are unavailable in US markets due 
to prohibitive disclosure regulations, while recent regulations in European markets allowed few studies 
in France, Belgium, Germany and Italy (Tutuncu, 2020). Nonetheless, studies engaging discount data 
document conflicting results regarding the relation between discounts and underpricing (Deloof et al., 
2009; Paleari et al., 2014; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015).  
Actually, the literature review and hypothesis section reveals a major research gap: the relationship 
between discounts and underpricing has not been examined extensively. Although examining such 
relation represents a direct test of IPOs underpricing theories’ main assumption. Hence, our study 
focuses on discounts’ impact on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. We believe that the 
conflicting results documented regarding the relation between discounts and underpricing are due to 
considering discounts as one component. Accordingly, we argue that discounts are composed of two 
components, warranted and unwarranted discounts. Warranted discounts (MP – FVE / FVE) represent 
the justified part of discounts that reduces valuation errors. These discounts enhance IPOs valuation 
performance and reduce overpricing. Contrarily, unwarranted discounts (discount – warranted discount) 
represent the unjustified part of discounts that increase valuation errors. These discounts degrade IPOs 
valuation performance and increase underpricing. Sum of warranted and unwarranted discounts equals 
discounts reported in prospectus and applied by underwriters to FVE when setting FOP. It is worth 
noting that although both IPOs valuation performance and underpricing indicate the difference between 
MP and FOP, they are computed differently. In fact, while valuation performance is computed as [(FOP 
– MP)/MP] (Dittmann and Maug, 2008), underpricing is computed as [(MP – FOP)/FOP]. Furthermore, 
valuation performance is examined through valuation errors in terms of bias and accuracy.  
While underpricing theories argue that IPOs are intentionally priced at a discount, we find that only 
unwarranted discounts account for such phenomenon, whereas warranted discounts reduce overpricing. 
Hence, discount without distinction between its two components (warranted and unwarranted) is not an 
adequate underpricing measure. Our findings reveal that warranted discounts are negatively related to 
underpricing and FOP accuracy errors. Whereby, applying warranted discounts to FVE results in FOP 
closer to MP, which enhances IPOs valuation performance and reduces overpricing. Contrarily, 
unwarranted discounts are positively related to underpricing and FOP accuracy errors. Whereby, 
applying unwarranted discounts to FVE results in FOP far from MP, which degrades IPOs valuation 
performance and increases underpricing. Examining discounts allocation shows that warranted 
discounts are allocated solely to FVE with valuation optimism and are positively related to FVE bias 
errors. Conversely, unwarranted discounts are mainly allocated to FVE with valuation pessimism and 
are negatively related to FVE bias errors.  
Our study makes two key contributions to IPOs underpricing literature. First, we show the different 
impacts warranted and unwarranted discounts have on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. 
Second, we show the different allocation patterns of warranted and unwarranted discounts to FVE when 
setting FOP. Additionally, our study reveals relevant practical implications for issuers, underwriters, 
investors and regulators. While unwarranted discounts allow issuers assessing underpricing level and 
underwriters’ sub-optimal efforts, they allow investors assessing their positive returns. Whereas 
warranted discounts allow issuers to avoid overpricing IPOs and communicate their intrinsic value, 
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investors to assess their negative returns, and underwriters to reveal their superior qualitative valuation. 
Regulators can increase after-market efficiency and protect investors through unwarranted discounts’ 
constraints and warranted discounts’ thresholds. 
We believe that the Moroccan stock exchange is an interesting study case because it is characterized by 
high uncertainty and information asymmetry, and where discounts play a lead role in IPOs valuation. 
Hence, such context allows us investigating discounts’ impact on IPOs valuation performance and 
underpricing to their utmost potential. Generally, emerging markets are associated with more ex-ante 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. These concerns are accentuated in the Moroccan stock 
exchange because of its characteristics. For instance, the Moroccan stock exchange suffers from low 
liquidity that caused its reclassification from an emerging market to a frontier market in 2013. 
Additionally, large banks dominate capitalization while mutual funds dominate trading. Therefore, 
private information is closely held by privileged investors only. Furthermore, the Moroccan stock 
exchange allows only fixed-price offerings. In fact, IPOs valuation is finalized and remains stagnant 
months before file submission regardless of investors’ demand, unlike book building offerings. Under 
these circumstances, discounts communicated in the prospectus are vital public information to most 
investors. Additionally, as discounts mark the last stage of IPOs valuation, they directly impact IPOs 
valuation performance and underpricing.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines related literature and develops 
hypothesis, section 3 presents sample and methodology, section 4 reports results and develops 
discussions and section 5 highlights main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
IPOs underpricing is a phenomenon extensively examined worldwide. Yet, why issuers leave money 
on the table when going public is still considered an IPO puzzle. Theoretically, four main explanations 
are provided (Ljungqvist, 2007). Asymmetric information theories explain underpricing with one of 
IPOs key parties being more informed than others, whether underwriters (Baron, 1982), investors 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Rock, 1986) or issuers (Ibbotson, 1975). Institutional theories explain 
underpricing with litigation avoidance (Logue, 1973), price stabilization activities (Ruud, 1993) or tax 
opportunities (Rydqvist, 1997). Ownership and control theories explain that underpricing serves either 
to maintain lead management (Brennan and Franks, 1997) or to reduce agency costs (Stoughton and 
Zechner, 1998). Last, behavioral theories explain underpricing with issuer’s behavioral biases 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002) or irrational investors’ presence (Ljungqvist et al., 2004; Welch, 1992).  
Empirically, studies investigating IPOs underpricing determinants in emerging markets provide many 
insights. Most of these studies are associated with signaling theories under asymmetric information 
explanations (Ibbotson, 1975). Whereby issuer uses signaling to reduce ex-ante uncertainty and 
information asymmetry between investors (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Studies document a negative 
correlation between underpricing and reputation, whether of underwriters or auditors (Albada et al., 
2019a, 2019b; D. Sundarasen, 2019; Kaur and Singh, 2019; Kenourgios et al., 2007; Ong et al., 2020; 
Pratoomsuwan, 2012). Issuers seem to accept the costs of hiring reputable underwriters or auditors. 
Doing so benefit issuers by reducing opinion heterogeneity among investors, which leads to lower 
underpricing. A negative correlation is also documented between book building (Mehmood et al., 2020) 
and institutional ownership (D. Sundarasen, 2019; Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013; Dumrongwong, 
2020). This highlights the essential role institution's retention strategy plays in reducing information 
asymmetry as well as maintaining market stability. Contrarily, there is a positive correlation with 
government-controlled firms (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). These firms are subject to more 
underpricing. Other determinants are associated with mixed results depending on the study’s country. 
For instance, there is a negative correlation with oversubscription in Pakistan (Mehmood et al., 2020), 
yet a positive one in Greece (Kenourgios et al., 2007). Mixed results are reported by other studies 
(Dhamija and Arora, 2017; Hearn, 2014; Javid and Malik, 2016; Omran, 2005; Sahoo and Rajib, 2010; 
Tran et al., 2013). Regarding information determinants, studies document a positive correlation with 
the media tone of conveying information in China (Zhang et al., 2020). Information conveyed by media 
is emotional, which affects investors’ sentiment and stimulates optimism. Contrarily, a negative 
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correlation is documented with information availability in India (Chhabra et al., 2017). Whereby, 
issuers that disclose much information to the public are subject to less underpricing because they are 
more transparent. Regarding board determinants, there is a negative correlation with directors’ board 
and female directors (Badru et al., 2019; Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013; Handa and Singh, 2015), yet a 
positive correlation with board’s independence in Indonesia (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). Female 
directors on directors’ board during IPOs can be considered as a desirable signal of IPOs quality. 
Regarding regulation, there is a positive correlation with pricing regulations and a negative one with 
government-approved regulations (Tian and Zhang, 2014). These researchers conclude that Chinese 
IPOs underpricing magnitude decreases over time with newer regulations. Additionally, studies that 
examined direct variables agree that firm age, IPOs price and issue size are negatively related to 
underpricing, while industry, timing and market volatility are positively related (Rathnayake et al., 
2019).  
However, IPOs underpricing theories’ main assumption is that IPOs are priced at a discount. Whereby, 
FOP incorporates a finite discount, which results in underpricing. Yet, we notice that discounts as a 
determinant of IPOs underpricing have not been examined extensively. Actually, only a limited number 
of studies examining IPOs discounts can be found due to the public unavailability of such information. 
Most of these studies report that discounts are applied to FVE before setting FOP (Cassia et al., 2004; 
Deloof et al., 2009; Paleari et al., 2014; Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; 
Vismara et al., 2015). They explain that underwriters deliberately overestimate IPOs to justify applying 
high levels of discounts. Rasheed et al. (2018), Roosenboom (2012) and Tutuncu (2020) find that 
discounts depend on valuation optimism. Additionally, Cassia et al. (2004), Paleari et al. (2014) and 
Vismara et al. (2015) find that underwriters perform a biased selection of peers to overestimate IPOs. 
However, inconsistent results are documented regarding the relation between discounts and 
underpricing. Through interviews with underwriters, Deloof et al. (2009) explain that discounts allow 
offering good opportunities to IPOs parties. Roosenboom (2012) finds that discounts are positively 
related to underpricing. Contrarily, Tutuncu (2020) documents rather a negative relation. Similarly, 
Cassia et al. (2004), Paleari et al. (2014) and Vismara et al. (2015) report the persistence of valuation 
optimism even after discounts and claim that discounts serve to make IPOs appear conservative. 
Moreover, Jeribi and Jarboui (2015, 2014) discover that discounts allow promoting institutional 
investors and that issuers hire reputed underwriters to do so. Yet, these investors do not consider 
discounts as a credible signal. 
We believe that the conflicting results documented regarding the relation between discounts and 
underpricing are due to considering discounts as one component. Hence, our main argument is that 
discounts are composed of two components, warranted and unwarranted discounts. Warranted discounts 
represent justified discounts necessary to correct valuation errors. Applying warranted discounts to FVE 
should lead to FOP closer to MP. Consequently, warranted discounts are supposed to enhance IPOs 
valuation performance and reduce overpricing. Contrarily, unwarranted discounts represent unjustified 
discounts that increase valuation errors. Applying unwarranted discounts to FVE should lead to FOP 
far from MP. Therefore, unwarranted discounts are supposed to degrade IPOs valuation performance 
and increase underpricing. Hence: 
 H1.1: warranted discounts are negatively related to underpricing. 
 H1.2: unwarranted discounts are positively related to underpricing. 
Additionally, both IPOs underpricing and FOP valuation performance are indicative of the difference 
between MP and FOP. When underpricing is important, so are FOP valuation errors and vice-versa. 
Hence, hypothesis 1 implies hypothesis 2: 
 H2.1: warranted discounts are negatively related to FOP accuracy errors. 
 H2.2: unwarranted discounts are positively related to FOP accuracy errors. 
Moreover, as reported by previous studies, FVE is mainly optimistic (Cassia et al., 2004; Paleari et al., 
2014; Rasheed et al., 2018; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015). This optimism 
means that FVE is above MP, and consequently suffers from positive valuation errors. As warranted 
discounts are supposed to correct these errors, their level should depend on FVE valuation errors level. 
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In other words, higher FVE valuation errors require higher warranted discounts. Contrarily, 
unwarranted discounts lead to FVE far from MP and increase underpricing. Therefore, we expect that 
their level is conversely related to FVE valuation errors level. That is, lower FVE valuation errors 
implies higher unwarranted discounts. Hence:  
 H3.1: warranted discounts are positively related to FVE bias errors. 
 H3.2: unwarranted discounts are negatively related to FVE bias errors. 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Sample 
Since the creation of the Casablanca stock exchange in 1929, the only Moroccan stock exchange, 75 
IPOs were conducted. Data about FVE, discounts and FOP were hand collected from the prospectus 
available on the Moroccan stock exchange’s website. IPOs with unavailable data were omitted from 
our study. Hence, reducing our initial sample from 75 to 39 IPOs. These IPOs were conducted between 
2004 and 2018. Data about closing MP were hand collected from the Moroccan stock exchange’s 
website. Consistent with prior studies, we use both 1st day and average 1st month MP (Berkman et al., 
2000; Deloof et al., 2009; Kim and Ritter, 1999; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020). Whereby, results 
using one MP serve to corroborate results using the other MP. Moreover, we do not base our study 
solely on 1st day MP because the Moroccan stock exchange applies a volatility limit of 10% for newly 
listed equities. This is consistent with Ljungqvist (2007), who suggests examining IPOs MP over a 
longer period in less developed markets or in the presence of daily volatility limits. As we found that 
both MP lead to the same conclusions, we report results using only the average 1st month MP. However, 
results using the 1st day MP are available upon request to authors. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. dev 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
Age 32 22 13 25 54 4 88 
Satisfaction rate (%) 14.03 17.06 3.39 7.46 15.79 0.97 71.39 
Subscription ratio 23.86 26.7 6.32 13.4 29.46 1.4 103.57 
FVE 629.73 361.8 343.00 542.00 854.6 68.5 1 311.9 
Discount (%) 13.95 6.37 12.63 14.9 17.00 0.00 30.00 
Warranted discount (%) 5.87 6.84 0.00 0.00 14.19 0.00 18.40 
Unwarranted discount (%) 8.08 7.69 0.53 7.72 13.00 0.00 30.00 
FOP 548.22 332.76 288.00 514.00 729.00 64.22 1 250.00 
1st day MP 593.48 366.44 264.00 556.00 820.00 70.64 1 375.00 
Average 1st month MP 684.02 446.66 334.87 684.45 950.60 77.18 1 901.73 
1st day underpricing (%) 7.42 5.08 3.92 9.96 10.00 -9.72 20.59 
Average 1st month underpricing (%) 23.86 31.28 1.24 14.32 31.06 -9.42 133.36 
 
Our sample is composed of relatively mature issuers, with a median age of 25 years. This is consistent 
with the fact that almost half of our sample conducted IPOs by offering existing shares (48.72%) rather 
than offering new ones (33.33%). More than half of issuers went public between 2006 and 2008 
(56.41%), strangely amide the global financial crisis. However, since then, a noticeable decrease in the 
number of IPOs per year is witnessed. These issuers are spread across 20 different industries, 
particularly “Hardware, Software & IT Services” (15.38%) and “Distributors” (12.82%). Consequently, 
we use these two sectors and issuing period [2006 – 2008] as dummy variables to account for their 
impact on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. For the valuation of IPOs, most of our sample 
went public through fixed price IPOs (71.79%) as opposed to open price IPOs (28.21%). This later one 
is a fixed price range offer. Most issuers used a combination of DCF and national comparable multiples 
(72.92%) to reach individual estimates in terms of valuation methods. A median discount of 14.90% is 
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applied to FVE when setting FOP. IPOs underpricing level in Morocco (14.32%) is close to other 
emerging markets, such as Hungary (15.1%), Iran (11.1%), Philippines (14.0%), Taiwan (16.3%) and 
Turkey (14.6%) (Rathnayake et al., 2019). Some relevant insights on the Moroccan stock exchange can 
be deduced from our sample. Particularly, satisfaction rate is less than 100% with a 0median of 7.46%, 
indicating that shares in-offer are inferior to shares in-demand. Likewise, the subscriptions ratio is 
superior to one with a median of 13.40, indicating that total proceeds are inferior to subscriptions’ 
amount.  
3.2. Methodology 
Our study examines IPOs underpricing theories’ main assumption stating that IPOs are priced at a 
discount. Whereby, FOP incorporates a finite discount, which results in IPOs underpricing. As argued 
above, we believe that the conflicting results documented regarding the relation between discounts and 
underpricing are due to considering discounts as one component (Cassia et al., 2004; Deloof et al., 2009; 
Paleari et al., 2014; Roosenboom, 2012; Tutuncu, 2020; Vismara et al., 2015). Our main argument is 
that discounts are composed of two components: warranted and unwarranted discounts. We use this 
argument to examine discounts in depth. Warranted discount ((MP – FVE)/FVE) is the justified 
discount that reduces valuation errors and overpricing. Unwarranted discount (discount – warranted 
discount) is the unjustified discount that increase valuation errors and underpricing. Sum of warranted 
and unwarranted discounts equals discounts applied by underwriters and reported in IPOs prospectus. 
Table 2: Variables’ definitions 
Optimistic FVE  FVE above MP 
FVE bias errors Difference between FVE and MP on MP 
FOP accuracy errors Absolute difference between FOP and MP on MP 
FVE high-bias (accuracy) Dummy variable for FVE with bias (accuracy) errors superior to the 50th percentile 
Discount Deliberate discount reported in prospectus and applied to FVE when setting FOP 
Warranted discount Difference between MP and FVE on FVE 
Unwarranted discount Difference between discount and unwarranted discount 
Subscription ratio Subscriptions total amount on IPOs proceeds 
Satisfaction rate Shares in-offer on shares in-demand 
Fixed price Fixed price offerings dummy variable 
New shares IPOs with new shares offered dummy variable 
Existing shares IPOs with existing shares offered dummy variable 
Method IPOs using combination of valuation methods dummy variable 
Age Number of years between issuer’s creation date and IPO’s date 
Year IPOs conducted between 2006 and 2008 dummy variable 
Industry “Hardware, Software & IT Services” and “Distributors” industries dummy variable 
 
To test H1, we examine the relation between discounts and underpricing using multivariate OLS 
regression with robust errors: 
Underpricing = β0 + β1Subscription + β2Satisfaction + β3Fixedprice + β4Newshares +  
β5Existingshares +  β6Methode +  β7Age + β8Year + β9Industry + β10FVEhighbias + 
β11FVEhighaccuracy + β12OptimisticFVE +  β13Discount [β13Warranted + β14Unwarranted]+  εi  (1) 
Similarly, we examine the relation between discounts and FOP accuracy errors to test H2: 
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FOP accuracy errors = β0 + β1Subscription + β2Satisfaction + β3Fixedprice + β4Newshares +  
β5Existingshares +  β6Methode +  β7Age + β8Year + β9Industry + β10FVEhighbias + 
β11FVEhighaccuracy + β12Discount [β12Warranted + β13Unwarranted]+  εi  (2) 
Furthermore, to test H3, we examine discounts determinants, whereby the main variable of interest is 
FVE bias errors: 
Discount [Warranted discount, Unwarranted discount] = β0 + β1Subscription + β2Satisfaction + 
β3Fixedprice + β4Newshares +  β5Existingshares +  β6Methode +  β7Age + β8Year + β9Industry + 
β10FVEbiaserror +  εi  (3) 
Our models incorporate additional variables aside from direct ones used in prior studies extensively, 
such as subscription, satisfaction, age, industry and others (Rathnayake et al., 2019). Additionally, 
Roosenboom (2012) and Tutuncu (2020) used as dependent variables FVE bias and accuracy errors. 
However, both did not include discounts as independent variable in their models, which we did. 
Moreover, Roosenboom (2012) used FVE accuracy errors as independent variable when explaining 
discounts and found a positive relation. Tutuncu (2020) used optimism as independent variable when 
explaining discounts and also found a positive relation. In addition to these variables, we also include 
dummy variables for FVE with high bias and accuracy errors to account for the impact of FVE with 
important errors. All multivariate OLS regression models were subject to backward deletion entry and 
only the final regression model is reported. When using such entry method, all independent variables 
are initially incorporated into the model simultaneously. Subsequently, independent variables are 
deleted sequentially if they do not contribute significantly to the model. Consequently, only variables 
that result in the best possible model are left, that is, the model with the highest Adj. R². This is different 
from other studies that used direct entry, where all variables are entered into the model simultaneously. 
We also used forward selection entry, which is the opposite of backward deletion entry. However, we 
found that using the latter approach results in higher Adj.R².  
 
4. Results and discussions 
When investigating IPOs underpricing explainability, we find that discounts are a significant 
determinant at the 1% level. Table 3 documents a positive relation between underpricing and discounts, 
whereby discounts increase underpricing. Accordingly, discounts increase valuation errors, which 
degrade IPOs valuation performance and contribute to IPOs underpricing. This is consistent with 
Roosenboom's (2012) results. However, despite his model incorporating more variables, his Adj. R² is 
inferior to ours (17.10% VS 61.82%). Contrarily, Tutuncu (2020) documents a negative relation, with 
an Adj. R² of 16.48% when using 113 samples and an Adj. R² of 52.12% when using 43 samples. We 
find that underpricing is also positively related to subscription ratio and FVE with high-accuracy errors, 
while negatively related to FOP bias and accuracy errors. As the subscription ratio conveys information 
about investors’ demand for IPOs, high-demand IPOs are subject to more underpricing than low-
demand IPOs, which is consistent with Roosenboom (2012) and Tutuncu (2020). Because both 
underpricing and FOP valuation performance are indicative of the difference between MP and FOP, we 
should find the same relation with discounts when examining FOP accuracy errors instead of 
underpricing. Consistently, table 3 documents a positive relation between these errors and discounts 
when examining FOP accuracy errors’ explainability. This relation suggests that FOP accuracy errors 
increase with discounts. As these errors increase with discounts, FOP drift away from MP, degrading 
IPOs valuation performance and contributing to IPOs underpricing. Similarly to the underpricing 
model, we also find that FOP accuracy errors are positively related to subscription ratio and FVE errors 
with high accuracy. 
A closer analysis reveals that discounts are allocated to optimistic (15.20%) and pessimistic (12.87 %) 
FVE when setting FOP as documented in table 4. Contrarily to optimistic FVE, pessimistic ones are 
below MP and require positive price updates rather than discounts to correct valuation pessimism. Such 
price updates reduce valuation errors. Therefore, allocating discounts to pessimistic FVE further 
deviates them from MP, which degrades IPOs valuation performance and contributes to IPOs 
underpricing.  
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Additionally, we discover in table 5 that discounts are allocated more to high-bias FVE (15.20%) than 
low ones (12.87%). As high-bias FVE are associated with more valuation errors, they require more 
discounts to correct such errors. These results are consistent with Roosenboom (2012) and Tutuncu 
(2020). Although, our medians are smaller than those reported by Roosenboom (2012), with a 23.3% 
median discount allocated to high-bias valuations and 16.7% median discount allocated to low-bias 
valuations. Likewise, Tutuncu (2020) documents that valuations in the high-discount quintile are more 
biased (38.78%) than valuation in the low-discount quintile (12.65%). Our findings suggest a positive 
relation between FVE bias errors and discounts. Indeed, regression results documented in table 3 reveal 
that discounts are positively related to FVE bias errors as well as IPO year dummy. Hence, discounts 
increase with FVE bias errors. This suggests that discounts’ level is set to correct these errors, which 
would enhance IPOs valuation performance and reduce IPOs overpricing. Moreover, IPOs conducted 
between 2006 and 2008 are subject to more discounts. Our findings show that when FVE errors 
increase, discounts increases accordingly. However, this leads to an increase in both FOP errors and 
underpricing. These results suggest that discounts applied are more than enough to correct FVE errors. 
Consequently, we cannot consider that the entire discount applied to FVE when setting FOP is justified. 
Accordingly, we deduce that only part of the discount applied enhances IPOs valuation performance 
and reduces overpricing. Therefore, we argue that discounts are composed of two distinctive 
components: warranted and unwarranted discounts. Whereby warranted discounts enhance IPOs 
valuation performance and reduce overpricing, contrarily to unwarranted discounts. Hence, while IPOs 
underpricing theories argue that IPOs are priced at a discount, only unwarranted discounts account for 
such phenomenon. 
OLS multivariate regression with robust errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Table 3: OLS multivariate regressions 
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Adj. R² 0.6182*** 0.7817*** 0.7436*** 0.8569*** 0.1376** 0.7186*** 0.2590*** 
 
When referring to warranted and unwarranted discounts to examine underpricing explainability, we find 
that both are significant determinants at the 1% level. Whereby, warranted discounts are negatively 
related to underpricing, contrarily to unwarranted discounts that are positively related. One standard 
deviation increase in warranted discounts results in 65.83% less underpricing. Whereas one standard 
deviation increase in unwarranted discounts results in 41.88% more underpricing. These results reveal 
that warranted discounts decrease underpricing and therefore enhance IPOs valuation performance 
because they converge FOP towards MP. Contrarily, unwarranted discounts increase underpricing and 
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therefore degrade IPOs valuation performance because they deviate FOP from MP. Accordingly, H1.1 
and H1.2 are confirmed. We also document that underpricing is positively related to issuer’s age and 
FVE with high-accuracy errors. Hence, mature issuers are subject to more underpricing, and therefore 
weaker IPOs valuation performance. This is different from the negative relation expected with age by 
Rathnayake et al. (2019). We notice that the regression model that incorporates warranted and 
unwarranted discounts (Adj. R²: 78.17%), instead of discounts (Adj. R²: 61.82%), better explain 
underpricing. This actually applies to all of our other regression models. Because both underpricing and 
FOP valuation performance indicate the difference between MP and FOP, we should find the same 
relation with warranted and unwarranted discounts when examining FOP accuracy errors instead of 
underpricing. Indeed, we find that both warranted and unwarranted discounts are statistically significant 
determinants at 1% level when examining FOP accuracy errors explainability. Table 3 reports a negative 
relation between warranted discounts and FOP accuracy errors, contrarily to unwarranted discounts. 
One standard deviation increase in warranted discounts results in 71.22% less FOP accuracy errors. 
Whereas, one standard deviation increase in unwarranted discounts results in 40.41% more FOP 
accuracy errors. These results indicate that warranted discounts reduce FOP valuation errors as they 
bring FOP closer to MP. Contrarily, unwarranted discounts increase FOP valuation errors as they further 
deviate FOP from MP. Accordingly, H2.1 and H2.2 are confirmed. Additionally, we find that FOP 
accuracy errors are positively associated with industry and FVE with high accuracy error. This is 
different from the positive relation expected with industry (Rathnayake et al., 2019). We notice that the 
regressions models (underpricing and FOP accuracy errors) using discounts and those using warranted 
and unwarranted discounts lead to different results. These results clearly show that warranted and 
unwarranted discounts have different impacts on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. While 
IPOs underpricing theories argue that IPOs are deliberately priced at a discount, we find that only 
unwarranted discounts account for such phenomenon. Applying warranted discounts to FVE results in 
FOP closer to MP, which enhances IPO valuation performance and reduces overpricing. Contrarily, 
applying unwarranted discounts to FVE results in FOP far from MP, which degrades IPOs valuation 
performance and increases underpricing. Hence, discount without distinction between its two 
components (warranted and unwarranted) is not an adequate underpricing measure. 
Except N, all figures are in percent (%). Significance is tested using t-test for means and sign-rank test for medians. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Table 4:  Discounts allocation by FVE 
 N Mean Std. dev 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
Discounts  
FVE 
Optimistic 19 16.05** 3.13 14.35 15.20** 17.00 12.63 25.00 
Pessimistic 20 11.96** 7.95 5.50 12.87** 15.55 0.00 30.00 
Warranted discounts  
FVE 
Optimistic 19 12.05*** 4.48 9.28 14.19*** 15.00 2.73 18.40 
Pessimistic 20 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unwarranted discounts  
FVE 
Optimistic 19 3.40*** 4.87 0.00 1.28*** 8.55 0.00 12.21 
Pessimistic 20 11.96*** 7.95 5.50 12.87*** 15.55 0.00 30.00 
 
A closer analysis reveals that warranted discounts are allocated solely to optimistic FVE (14.19%), as 
reported in table 4. Allocating warranted discounts to these estimates reduces valuation errors, which 
reduces optimism. Consequently, warranted discounts enhance IPOs valuation performance and reduce 
overpricing because they result in FVE closer to MP. We notice that warranted discounts are not 
allocated to pessimistic FVE. These estimates require price-update rather than discounts to reduce 
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valuation errors. Hence, applying any warranted discounts to pessimistic FVE further deviates them 
from MP, which degrades IPOs valuation performance and increases underpricing. Contrarily, 
unwarranted discounts are allocated to both optimistic (1.28%) and pessimistic (12.87%) FVE, with a 
particular preference to pessimistic ones. Actually, unwarranted discounts increase valuation errors for 
both pessimistic and optimistic FVE. Pessimistic FVE are already below MP and require price-update, 
rather than discounts, to reduce valuation errors. Applying any discounts to these estimates further 
increases valuation errors and deviates them from MP. Whereas warranted discounts ought to have 
corrected FVE optimism entirely. The only exception is for FVE still suffering from optimism even 
after warranted discounts. In such case, the warranted discount equals the discount reported in IPO 
prospectus, which is not enough to correct entirely valuation optimism. Surprisingly, unwarranted 
discounts are not allocated to these estimates. These results suggest that valuation optimism is positively 
related to warranted discounts and negatively related to unwarranted discounts.  
Except N, all figures are in percent (%). Significance is tested using t-test for means and sign rank test for medians. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Table 5: Discounts allocation by FVE valuation errors  
  N Mean Std. dev 25th per 50th per 75th per Min Max 
Discounts 
 Bias errors 
Low 20 11.96** 7.95 5.50 12.87** 15.55 0.00 30.00 
High 19 16.05** 3.13 14.35 15.20** 17.00 12.63 25.00 
Accuracy errors 
Low 19 13.46*** 7.79 10.20 14.90 18.00 0.00 30.00 
High 20 14.42*** 4.80 13.00 14.85 15.88 2.60 25.00 
Warranted discounts 
 Bias errors 
Low 20 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High 19 12.05*** 4.48 9.28 14.19*** 15.00 2.73 18.40 
Accuracy errors 
Low 19 2.66*** 4.15 0.00 0.00** 6.35 0.00 11.51 
High 20 8.92*** 7.56 0.00 13.66** 14.92 0.00 18.40 
Unwarranted discounts  
 Bias errors 
Low 20 11.96*** 7.95 5.50 12.87*** 15.55 0.00 30.00 
High 19 3.40*** 4.87 0.00 1.28*** 8.55 0.00 12.21 
Accuracy errors 
Low 19 10.80** 8.42 1.39 11.25** 15.80 0.00 30.00 
High 20 5.50** 6.06 0.00 2.13** 11.62 0.00 15.30 
 
Furthermore, we document in table 5 that warranted discounts are allocated more to FVE with high bias 
(14.19%) and accuracy (13.66%) errors. These estimates are mainly optimistic and therefore are mainly 
overvalued. This means that they require more discounts to reduce such errors, which explains the 
allocation of more warranted discounts. Hence, applying warranted discounts to these estimates aligns 
them with MP, which enhances IPOs valuation performance and reduces underpricing. Contrarily, 
unwarranted discounts are allocated more to FVE with low bias (12.87%) and accuracy (11.25%) errors. 
As FVE are mainly optimistic, FVE with low valuation errors are mainly undervalued. These estimates 
require positive price updates, instead of discounts to reduce valuation errors. Yet, more unwarranted 
discounts are allocated to these estimates, which increases valuation errors. This degrades IPOs 
valuation performance and contributes to underpricing. These results suggest that FVE bias errors are 
positively related to warranted discounts and negatively related to unwarranted discounts. Indeed, 
investigating warranted and unwarranted discounts explainability leads to corroborative results.  
Whereby, FVE bias errors are a statistically significant determinant at 1% and 5% levels. Table 3 reports 
a positive relation between these errors and warranted discounts, whereby one standard deviation 
increase in FVE bias errors results in 73.53% more warranted discounts. These findings indicate that 
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warranted discounts’ level increases with FVE bias errors in order to correct valuation optimism and 
converge FVE toward MP. This reduces valuation errors, which enhances IPOs valuation performance 
and reduces overpricing. Contrarily, we find a negative relationship between these errors and 
unwarranted discounts, where one standard deviation decrease in FVE bias errors results in 32.99% 
more unwarranted discounts. These results indicate that unwarranted discounts’ levels are high when 
FVE bias errors are low. It seems that unwarranted discounts are set with the intention of establishing 
a valuation pessimism. This increases valuation errors and therefore degrades IPOs valuation 
performance and contributes to IPOs underpricing. Accordingly, H3.1 and H3.2 are confirmed. We 
notice that the subscription ratio is positively related to warranted discounts, contrarily to unwarranted 
discounts. Consequently, high-demand IPOs are associated with superior valuation performance and 
lower underpricing than low-demand IPOs. Consistent with our results revealing that warranted and 
unwarranted discounts have different impacts on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing, we also 
find that warranted and unwarranted discounts are characterized with different allocation patterns. 
Warranted discounts are allocated solely to optimistic FVE and mainly to FVE with high bias and 
accuracy errors; this enhances IPOs valuation performance and reduces overpricing. Contrarily, 
unwarranted discounts are mainly allocated to pessimistic FVE and FVE with low bias and accuracy 
errors; this degrades IPOs valuation performance and increases underpricing. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the different impacts discounts have on IPOs valuation performance and 
underpricing. IPOs underpricing theories argue that IPOs are deliberately priced at a discount. However, 
our study reveals that only unwarranted discounts account for such phenomenon. Whereas, warranted 
discounts reduce overpricing. Hence, discount without distinction between its two components 
(warranted and unwarranted) is not an adequate underpricing measure. Our findings show that 
warranted discounts are negatively related to FOP accuracy errors and underpricing. Applying 
warranted discounts to FVE results in FOP closer to MP, which enhances IPO valuation performance 
and reduces overpricing. Contrarily, unwarranted discounts are positively related to FOP accuracy 
errors and underpricing. Applying unwarranted discounts to FVE results in FOP far from MP, which 
degrades IPOs valuation performance and increases underpricing. Examining discounts allocation 
shows that FVE bias errors are positively related to warranted discounts and negatively related to 
unwarranted discounts. Consistent with our initial predictions, all three hypothesis are confirmed. 
Our study reveals relevant practical implications for issuers, underwriters, investors and regulators. For 
issuers, we show that only unwarranted discounts represent money left on the table rather than discounts 
entirely. Hence, issuers can use unwarranted discounts to assess the underpricing level and negotiate 
with underwriters accordingly. Because underwriters can use unwarranted discounts to generate excess 
demand with less effort, issuers can use these discounts to account for underwriters' sub-optimal 
marketing and distribution efforts. Moreover, issuers can use the warranted discount to avoid 
overpricing their IPOs, which is costly. Overpriced IPOs success is skeptical and may result in the 
offer’s failure. They also negatively affect issuers’ reputation and their subsequent offerings. Issuers 
can also use warranted discounts to communicate their intrinsic value to the market, since such 
discounts converge FOP toward MP. 
Similarly, underwriters can use warranted discounts to show the superior qualitative valuation they are 
capable of performing. Such valuation supplements the quantitative one conducted using valuation 
methods. Underwriters can also use warranted discounts to avoid overpricing IPOs, which are costly. 
They negatively affect underwriters’ reputation, and consequently, their client investors and 
information access. Initial returns that investors earn on underpriced IPOs do not come from discounts 
entirely but from unwarranted discounts only. Hence, investors can use these discounts to assess their 
positive returns. Whereas, they can use warranted discounts to assess negative returns from overpriced 
IPOs. Regulators can protect investors, including issuers, through discounts. Warranted discounts can 
protect from overpricing IPOs, while unwarranted discounts can protect from underpricing IPOs. Both 
IPOs’ types are associated with mispricing, which affects after-market efficiency and may lead to 
opportunist behavior. Regulators are able to enhance after-market efficiency by imposing unwarranted 
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discount constraints to restrain underpricing’s level. Whereas imposing warranted discounts threshold 
is more adequate as it guarantees to correct at least some of valuation optimism. 
Limitation and study forward 
The relatively small sample size of 39 IPOs out of the main population of 75 IPOs represents the main 
limitation of our study. This is due to discount data unavailability, as explained in the sample and 
methodology section. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to broaden the study to account for findings 
in other countries where discount data is available. 
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